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The other interesting aspect of this
work deals with the difference between
prewar training of our submariners and
what they actually did in combat. In a
section called “The Accidental Commerce Raiders,” Holwitt points out that
commanders had been conditioned by
article 22 of the London Naval Treaty—
which many thought meant that if they
torpedoed merchants without warning,
they would actually be held liable,
“hunted down and captured or sunk as
pirates.” So, according to this account,
commanders were taught to be cautious
and were essentially trained for naval
combat against high-speed, heavily armored combatants and not against
commercial shipping. The result was
that very few of the tactics eventually
used were developed before the war.
Execute Against Japan should be required reading for naval officers (especially in submarine wardrooms), as well
as for anyone interested in history, policy, or international law. Lieutenant
Holwitt has already briefed some of our
Naval War College students. His research shows how and why our experience in the First World War did not
prepare us for the next one, and this is
its essential lesson. It is a lesson worth
some reflection.
REAR ADMIRAL JAMES P. WISECUP, U.S. NAVY

Naval War College

Mueller, Michael. Canaris: The Life and Death of
Hitler’s Spymaster. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007. 320pp. $34.95

Who was Wilhelm Canaris? The naval
cadet from the Ruhr who rose to vice
admiral and directed the Abwehr,

German military intelligence, for nine
years remains one of the most intriguing figures in twentieth-century military history. German journalist and
documentarian Michael Mueller unravels several of the mysteries that surround Canaris’s life, though many
remain.
Mueller acknowledges the shortfall. Despite solid research and fresh archival
material, his account “neither answers
all the questions, nor resolves all the
contradictions.” The paucity of primary
sources and the tendency of intelligence
operators habitually to brush their
tracks owe much to the circumstances
of Canaris’s arrest and execution. Only
remnants survive of Canaris’s service
diaries, discovered by investigators in
the aftermath of the 20 July 1944 plot to
assassinate Hitler.
Mueller’s narrative informs, illuminates, and entertains. Canaris’s early career at sea was marked by escapades of
derring-do in South America and
Spain. An officer of his time, Canaris
absorbed the credo of the sea service,
and it served him well. He had a clear
talent for languages and social rapport,
and his superiors noted the vitality of
his wide-ranging networks. Before long,
he became “too valuable to send to
sea.”
An astute and calculating observer,
Canaris navigated multiple careerthreatening crises that began as the defeated German fleet returned to Kiel in
1918. In the closing years of the
Weimar Republic, Canaris again leveraged his luck, evading a series of potentially devastating political scandals. He
did not emerge unscathed, however; his
growing reputation made both naval officials and politicians nervous.
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If rivals watched with gimlet eyes,
Canaris’s political patrons had reason
to look the other way. He was soon enmeshed in the government’s efforts to
circumvent the naval-armament provisions of the Versailles treaty that had
ended World War I. With his international networks delivered, Canaris won
only muted applause in Berlin.
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder was leery
of Canaris, who he feared was compromised politically. Mueller acknowledges
the awkwardness between the two officers but emphasizes Raeder’s professionalism. Raeder’s own memoir
supports that judgment. Setting his
personal feelings aside, Raeder intervened to elevate Canaris to the head
of the Abwehr.
At first Canaris walked the razor’s edge
between collaboration with the Nazi
regime and open resistance. The spring
of 1938 was the turning point. The cumulative effect of the Blomberg and
Fritsch scandals, destroying the careers
of the war minister and the commanding general of the Wehrmacht, respectively, was too much for an old-school
naval officer. Still in uniform, Canaris
became the heart of the opposition circle in Abwehr headquarters.
Canaris’s career-long wrangling with
his political and diplomatic counterparts will resonate with military intelligence officers today. His death in the
bloodletting unleashed by Claus von
Stauffenberg’s failed attempt on Hitler’s
life is startling only for its accidental
nature. The real surprise is that he was
untouched until the Abwehr was dissolved in mid-1944.
Who was Wilhelm Canaris? A loyal servant of “the other Germany” or a
right-wing Nazi sympathizer? What
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accounts for Himmler’s indulgent, even
protective, attitude toward Canaris and
his circle? The wily yet principled admiral is an incomplete puzzle. However,
Mueller puts new pieces on the table,
while nudging others into place.
Readers will appreciate Muller’s abundant reference notes, exhaustive bibliography, and index. Sadly, the work is
marred by the absence of rigorous
copyediting and fact-checking; names
in particular suffer. But these are minor
quibbles. Mueller’s work is an important contribution to the literature, and
the Naval Institute deserves a laurel for
bringing it to these shores.
ANTHONY D. MCIVOR

Partner, Black Swan Advisors, LLC

Harari, Yuval Noah. Special Operations in the Age
of Chivalry: 1100–1550. Suffolk, U.K.: Boydell,
2007. 224pp. $90

Yuval Noah Harari published this book
in the midst of the ongoing struggles
among the Hezbollah militia from Lebanon, the Palestinian Hamas militias,
and the Israeli army. These contemporary events, especially the special operations undertaken by all sides, provide
the backdrop to this work. With regard
to medieval special operations, not
much has been written, and Harari endeavors to fill this void by focusing his
work on a general readership rather
than a strictly scholarly audience.
The title of this book is eye-catching
but immediately raises questions: What
does the author mean by “special operations,” and what is meant by “the Age
of Chivalry”? The author’s use of the
phrase, which dates back to the high
and late Middle Ages, is really nothing
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